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ABSTRACT
The employee stakeholder has a small voice when merger or
acquisition decisions are being made. This paper illuminates the
human element hidden within the Merger and Acquisition
process. The paper reviews workplace concepts such as trust,
change leadership, communication, and employee resistance.
Keywords: Managing people, mergers, acquisitions, change,
workplace trust, organizational culture.
1 INTRODUCTION
The process to merge two companies, or for one company to
acquire another, offers management researchers an opportunity
to discuss the impact on the human asset within this transaction.
It is understood that organizational leaders that buy, sell, or
merge companies, do so with the intention of improving the
economic position of its principals (Schuler & Jackson 2001).
Yet there are stakeholders that are negatively affected by a
change in leadership due to a merger or acquisition (Buono &
Bowditch 1989). How a company is assumed or acquired may
have a positive impact on shareholders, but a negative impact on
employees (Mackenzie, Penniman, & Woodsworth 2013). The
opinions vary on whether a merger is desirable primarily
because the financial benefits outweigh the costs (Auerbach
1988). Can a true value be calculated without considering the
role of employees’ knowledge and talent? Though it has been
suggested that “…corporate empire builders have increasingly
placed their faith in organizational growth through merger and
acquisition,” firms overestimate the potential economic benefit
as well as the ease of combining organizations so that the
resulting structure can be successful (Buono & Bowditch, 1989,
7). The discussion of people vs. process, as relates to mergers
and acquisitions, is the focus of this conference paper and
discussion.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Research findings on companies that are led by their founders
reflect stronger and more stable corporate cultures (Fauchart &
Gruber 2011). Acquisitions, or even a shift from being privately
to publicly held, can change the leadership focus, moving the
organizational mission away from the employees tightly held
assumptions and beliefs; thereby damaging the intangible assets
of the target business. Post-merger integration is essential, yet
may focus solely on process, and not on the people. Poorly
executed post-merger integration has been cited as a cause for
acquisitions ending up as divestitures within two years (Buono
& Bowditch 1989).

Corporate culture is a primary variable underlying the success or
failure in a merger. It is comprised of layers starting at the
explicit and observable artifacts such as banners, stories, and
promotional processes, and moving deeper to less explicit levels
such as values (Buono, Bowditch & Lewis 1985). Corporate
culture is a pervasive influence on organizations and can
increase or decrease the value of an organization, no different
than other intangible assets, such as company reputation,
customer loyalty, and analyst confidence.
Trust, fear, and security therefore become relevant topics when
discussing lessons learned from the outcomes of mergers or
acquisitions. These human conditions are tightly tied to the
influence of change upon the culture. Change management
literature offers a context within which we can better understand
employee fear, trust and security issues (Deal & Kennedy 2000).
Management Resistance
If management is resistant to being acquired, then the
purchasers may take the path toward a hostile take-over. As a
result, the acquiring firm may go directly to the stockholders via
a public tender offer. This public awareness may cause other
suitors to enter the market, thereby increasing the activity and
the offered price. But, if the acquiring company threatens to
replace the acquired company’s managers, these individuals
may further resist, regardless of whether the stockholders will
benefit (Ruback 1988; Shleifer & Vishny 1988).
The managers of the target firm may attempt to buy their own
company and take it private. A management buy-out (MBO) is a
form of acquisition; the managers borrow the money by inviting
the participation of investment bankers to partner with them to
buy the publicly held stock of their company. The outcome
appears financially beneficial to stockholders, who earn a
premium price on their stock; managers, who gain a larger
equity stake in their company and retain their roles; and,
investment bankers who gain both fees and a high return on
their investments (Shleifer & Vishny 1988). And though
managers may retain their position, they are often left with large
debt payments owed to their investment banker colleagues
(Mackenzie et al. 2013). The MBO restructuring "give
managers greater incentives to cut costs and to budget capital
more responsibly" (Shleifer & Vishny 1988, 101). This may
lead managers to take action upon the company in the form of
asset sales, layoffs or unprofitable operation shut-downs. The
new pressure to gain efficiencies benefit the organization with a
renewed profitability focus, but the security bestowed on the
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managers may result in less job-security on the nonmanagement employees. This leads to the discussion and
influence of workplace trust.
Workplace Trust
A corporate merger or acquisition often requires company
processes to be revised, communication to span company
boundaries, and unfamiliar groups of employees to cooperate
with management. The events related to a merger or an
acquisition may have a profound impact on the people who
spend their working lives in these organizations. Research has
revealed that the impact of the merger or acquisition is often
negative. Employees “watch co-workers get laid off, their career
paths and aspirations evaporate, their cynicism increase, and
their faith in their leadership diminish” (Marks 1994, vii).
Employee trust in leadership is closely tied to workplace health
(Mackenzie 2010). Helliwell (2008) suggested that employees’
trust in their coworkers and their managers is among the chief
workplace factors that influence life satisfaction. A loss of trust
will interfere with the optimization of the employees’ talents
(Mackenzie 2010). This can lead to the erosion of work
performance, increases in turnover, and a reduction in
subordinate support for managers (Merriman, Schmidt, Ross, &
Dunlap-Hinkler 2004, 13). Jacobs (2008, 53) recognized that
lost trust is difficult to regain. Productivity, morale, quality and
the organizational culture can be hurt if managers fail to
recognize that their workplace behaviors can damage their
employees trust in them. (Merriman et al. 2007; Merriman et al.
2004).
Faith and trust influence the relationships among individuals
and groups (Martins 2002; Helliwell 2008). Trust is necessary
for individuals to effectively transfer knowledge. A significant
influence upon the workplace relationship is the trust in the
leader (Ballinger & Schoorman 2007).
Sadly, “senior
executives generally score low on employee trust” (Krell 2006,
59).
Managers in a fast moving and quickly changing workplace
environment, which is the case with a corporate acquisition or
merger, need to have employees trust in their ability and
direction (Lufkin 2006). An essential lesson is that “trust takes
a long time to build, it can be easily destroyed, and is hard to
regain. Also, since breaking trust gives rise to distrust,
maintaining trust requires careful attention from management”
(Martins 2002, 754; Mackenzie 2010).
Employee Resistance to Change and the Leaders’ Role
The social identity of the employee with the workplace allows
the employee to understand his or her role and to function
effectively (Fauchart & Gruber 2011). Employees will reject,
interpret, and even distort information based on these beliefs
and mental models. Anger and insecurity can emerge when
these models and symbols are altered without proper
justification (Marks 1994, 34; Deal & Kennedy 2000, 157).
Organizational change within a healthy work environment is
viewed as “a path to a known state: something discreet, with

orderly, incremental and continuous steps … It may cause some
disruptions and require some adaptations, but its discrete nature
allows people to know exactly what to expect and lets them get
on with their lives inside and outside the organization” (Marks
1994, 17). A transition “is a path to an unknown state …
transition poses a break from the past … adapting to transition is
much more psychologically taxing than is adapting to change”
(Marks 1994, 18). Clearly, this is the situation with either a
merger or an acquisition.
A merger or acquisition involves stakeholders, whom will
respond differently to the transition required of a merger. An
external stakeholder with solely economic ties, such as a
shareholder, may never experience the psychological stress of
the transition. Yet, internal employee stakeholders will bring
their “personal needs to the organization in which they work”
(Carson 1999).
For many workers, including lower-level
managers, “change is neither sought after nor welcomed.
[Rather] it is disruptive and intrusive” (Strebel 1996). And,
unfortunately, employees tend to view change with suspicion
and negativity, until they are prepared to think otherwise
(Conner 1993). The employee stakeholder is most directly
influenced because “the merger is a source of high uncertainty
and reduced job security,” which may damage the economic
value of the merger because of the employee’s resistance
(Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 47). When two companies merge,
“radically innovative change” may be especially intimidating to
long-term employees and will lead to the greatest resistance
(Carson 1999).
After a merger or acquisition the communication style of leaders
must help employees revise their mental models so that
changing products, processes and practices are accepted as good
and necessary. Employees need security to permit predictability
to reenter their workplace lives (Vlamis 1999, 14-15). Only
then, if successful, will the culture adapt (Deal & Kennedy
2000, 158). If possible, employees’ should be actively involved
in the change process (Kim & Mauborgne 2003, 128). If change
occurs without any frontline employee involvement, they will
judge their managers more severely (Strebel 1996). If leaders
are not able to persuasively espouse and support an explanatory
vision for the transition, then “the force of the old culture can
neutralize and emasculate a proposed change” (Deal & Kennedy
2000, 158) with strategically valuable decisions being
undermined (Woodward & Hendry 2004, 159).
3 THE CASE OF BENQ-SIEMENS
The case of BenQ’s acquisition of Germany’s Siemens mobile
phone division illustrates a failure that is attributed to both
communication and culture (Cheng & Seeger 2012). The
acquisition created the fourth largest mobile phone brand,
BenQ-Siemens. After losing 500 million Euros, Taiwan-based
BenQ sought bankruptcy protection one year after the
acquisition. Culture and communication are intimately
connected, yet these organizations did not sufficiently consider
these variables. Substantially different in their cultural roots,
one represented the Oriental Confucian culture, which values
tradition, perseverance, and social obligations (Hofstede 1994)
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and the other the Germanic European culture, strongly focused
on a strong work ethic leaning to the engineering viewpoint
(Cheng and Seeger 2012, 120; Hofstede 1994, 12). BenQ is of a
collective culture and Siemens of a highly individualistic
culture. Another influential cultural difference is how the
employees view their relationship to their superiors. The Asian
culture has a very high power distance, respectful and obedient,
whereas the German culture is lower in the power distance
dimension, viewing the manager role as equal to the worker
(Hofstede 1994).
A key factor cited in the failure of this acquisition was the
management decisions emerging from the collectivist
Taiwanese culture. With a view toward maintaining harmony,
the BenQ chairman retained the Siemens division executive
leader, Clemens Joos, along with 2800 research employees,
believing that the result would be a cooperative and smooth
transition (Cheng & Seeger 2012, 120); but the BenQ chairman
realized his mistake in not replacing the leadership after the
acquisition, which would have allowed for a rapid, less
obstructed restructuring. The German individualist culture
places the workers’ families over the collective good of the
workplace community and organizational goals. Also, the role
of leadership as perceived by BenQ, with a strong respect for
the authority of management, was not consistent with the
German culture, where labor unions are strong, vacations are
plentiful, and no one works on the weekend. BenQ’s need to
heavily cooperate with labor unions was an unplanned bump in
a much damaged road.
Fear and suspicion clouded the merger and caused the Siemens
workers to distrust their new leaders viewing them as
incompetent; totally unprepared to assume their role in the
German market. Additionally, the Siemens workers felt that the
German executives had betrayed them, knowing that BenQ
could not save the division. The workers accused the German
executives of abandoning them to avoid the traditionally large
payoffs expected by workers when jobs are lost (Cheng and
Seeger 2012). Furthermore, the weak communication from the
German leaders in the early stages of the acquisition, leading to
the transition to BenQ, created severe uncertainty and distrust,
stress and turnover. BenQ, having the greater reason to comfort
the employees, did little to establish strong internal
communication processes that may have reduced the fear and
uncertainty. Post-acquisition new business strategies were being
introduced with the intent of rescuing the company; but,
communication was confusing and inconsistent. “The
organization should never have assumed that the employees
would understand why these transitions and changes were
taking place. Poor communication only confuses employees and
undermines top-down implementation” (Cheng & Seeger 2012,
123).
As failure became inevitable, the collective culture to avoid
shame, not for oneself, but for the group, led BenQ’s senior
leader to take full public responsibility for the failure,
intentionally preserving the reputation of others. “Thus, with
respect to Lee’s long-term leadership, directors at BenQ rejected
Chairman Lee’s resignation” (Cheng & Seeger 2012, 125). This

case provides value lessons pertaining to communication before,
during and after an acquisition as well as the severe, at times
unseen, influence of cultural differences.
4 THE CASE OF DAIMLER-CHRYSLER AG
The second case, which illustrates the intent of leadership to
effectively optimize communication before, after and during a
merger, is that of Chrysler Corp. in its merger with Daimler
Benz. The failure provides a lesson that employees require an
alignment in the cultural artifacts; what is espoused must also be
enacted. The espoused values will be tested as leaders' behaviors
reflect their true intent.
Chrysler Corporation and Daimler Benz appeared to be a merger
of equals; they produce similar products within the same
industry and are of similar size. The announcement of the
merger in May 1998 communicated a collaboration that would
result in an organization, Daimler-Chrysler AG, with a "truly
global reach" (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 47). It was only a few
years earlier in 1993 that had the Chrysler CEO, Robert Eaton,
articulating the desire for the company to "stay healthy" and
focus on "nuts and bolts" management. He stated that he would
be the first chairman to "never lead a Chrysler comeback"
(Marks 1994, 209). Yet, it was Robert Eaton who partnered with
Daimler chief executive, Jurgen Schrempp, on the "explanatory
and justificatory discourse ... directed to external audiences,
primary shareholders, internal audiences, employees as well as
dealers ... designed to primarily overcome resistance to the
creation of this new global corporation" (Fitzgibbon & Seeger
2002, 40). But a year after the merger the Chrysler group
revealed a drop in both sales and market share. Prior to the
merger Chrysler held 16.1% of the American auto industry
reporting a 20% sales increase over prior year. The year later
revealed a drop of 4% in sales and a market share of 15%. Two
years post-merger showed a further reduced market share of
13.6%. January 2001 had Daimler-Chrysler AG announcing an
elimination of 26,000 jobs in its Chrysler group along with a
major restructuring (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002). So, what
happened, and what can be learned?
As in the BenQ-Siemens case, the influence of culture was
under estimated. Both companies' communication content had
to reduce the doubt that major stakeholders had in this merger;
each stating that the ability to gain a global presence would not
have been realized without this merger. The sequence of public
awareness for the merger started on May 5th with "leaked news
of the potential Daimler Benz-Chrysler merger," followed by a
Chrysler Corp. released statement on May 6th confirming that
discussions were taking place, and an announcement of the
merger in London on May 7th 1998 (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002,
44). To manage the doubt, three communication speaking points
were established and frequently repeated: (1) the companies
formed a perfect fit due to the complementary strengths, no
overlap, and common cultural mission. (2) The creation of a
global entity as the result of economies of scale, yet the
retention of each company’s markets and unique brands. (3) A
voluntary marriage of equals, which reinforced that "Chrysler
would be allowed to maintain its uniqueness" even though the
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new entity would be incorporated in Germany (Fitzgibbon &
Seeger 2002, 49).
The outcome that these communicated metaphors were not
grounded in reality, led the merger to failure. Chrysler's culture
was one of transparency with stakeholders strongly embedded in
its transformation following it historic bailout and near
bankruptcy. Americans took pride in Chrysler’s recovery, many
feeling that they took part in saving this company by
intentionally buying its products. Labor and leadership had an
exceptional relationship with the president of the United Auto
Workers Union sitting on its board, and employees
remembering the sacrifices made with pride, to save their
company. The Americanization aura that surrounded Chrysler
emerged from Iacocca's advocating for limiting Japanese
imports in favor of the patriotic path of buying a US made car.
Even the Jewish community favored Chrysler over Ford due to
Ford's alignment with Germany during the war. Now, with their
company not only collaborating, but incorporating in Germany,
these cultural beliefs were being damaged. The marriage of
equals’ metaphor, though constantly reinforced in both sets of
leaders' communications, was not believable, especially "as top
Chrysler management left the company" and the marriage
metaphor was reframed by employees with a less than positive
interpretation (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 50).
What happened? External discourse, once tested, failed to align
with real decisions. For example, the Chrysler PR department
was restructured so "all communication post-merger had to be
cleared through Stuttgart, Germany," making Chrysler US
clearly subordinate to Germany’s Daimler Benz (Fitzgibbon &
Seeger 2002, 52). The elimination of 26,000 US jobs on January
2001 changed Chrysler group from an equal partner to a
subordinate business unit under the larger German based
organization. The confusion and lack of confidence in the
"marriage of equals" was an influencing factor in the stock value
drop from the new entity's initial value of $70 to the $48 value
early in 2001.

help employees return to normalcy. These take place first at the
company level with a clear vision of the post-merger
organization and the predictability of the integration strategies.
Also, the role of Human Resources must be prominent with
problems handled quickly and sensitively, recognizing that
“unmanaged
cultural
differences
will
lead
to
miscommunications and misunderstandings” (Schuler &
Jackson 2001, 251). Relevant to understanding communication
is Johlke et al.’s research (2000), which revealed the difference
between informal and formal communication styles; employees
need both. Therefore, an essential lesson is that senior leaders as
well as frontline managers must select the appropriate
communication style, based on the situation, to ensure that an
employee feels connected to the organization, his or her
manager, and the other team members (Solomon 2001, 60).
“The objective of organizational revitalization is not merely to
recover from transition, but to rebound with a workforce that
has an enhanced capacity to operate competitively.” (Marks
1994, 24-25).
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The intentions of both firms were sincere, but the severe cultural
differences could not be resolved once the strategic path did not
align with the communicated metaphors. "In many instances, the
initial metaphors were increasingly inconsistent with the
emerging reality” (Fitzgibbon & Seeger 2002, 53).
5 CONCLUSION
Following the merger or acquisition, leadership must embrace
the reasons to help the survivors recover (Harrison-Walker
2008), but self-talk that may include sentiments such as, “it’s a
lousy economy out there, aren’t people glad to have a job?” or
“Aren’t there others waiting in line for their jobs,” or “people
don’t want to look to the future, rather dwell on the past,” and
finally “haven’t people always dealt with change and transition
in organizations?” (Marks 1994, 22-24). These rationalizing
beliefs about the solely economic relationship between
employees and employers neglect the human element that
makes an organizational culture healthy and optimizes
performance. Schuler and Jackson (2001) provide a roadmap to
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